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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Boyce argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record
with various transcripts.

Mr. Boyce argues that the requested transcripts are

necessary for his appeal because the district court can utilize its own memory form the
prior proceedings when it decided to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.

Additionally,

Mr. Boyce argued that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation.
In response, the State argues that the requested transcripts cannot be added to
the appellate record because they did not exist prior to the probation violation
disposition hearing and, therefore, the district court did not consider them when it
revoked Mr. Boyce's probation. The State then uses aggravating information from the
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) when addressing Mr. Boyce's
argument that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation.
This brief is necessary to address the State's characterization of the requested
transcripts as new evidence. Mr. Boyce argues that requested transcripts are not new
evidence because the district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings
when it considers whether to revoke probation. Mr. Boyce also argues that the State
should be judicially estopped from arguing that the transcripts are irrelevant to the
probation issue while simultaneously arguing that aggravating information contained in
the PSI supports the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Boyce's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts have a broad range of discretion to consider information

when making sentencing decisions.

In light of that broad range of sentencing

discretion, Idaho appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide
complete records on appeal.

In instances where a complete record has not been

provided, appellate courts presume that the missing transcripts or exhibits support the
trial court's determinations on appeal. In some instances, appeals have been dismissed
due to the appellant's failure to provide transcripts of hearings which occurred years
before the disposition of the issue on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Boyce argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when he requested various transcripts 1 necessary to
provide an adequate record for appeal.

In response, the State argues that the

requested transcripts are not necessary because the district court did not have those
transcripts when it made the determination to revoke his probation. The State goes as
far as arguing that the requested transcripts would constitute new information on
appeal, which cannot be considered by an appellate court. The State's position is not

1

The State accurately points out that Mr. Boyce references an Admit/Deny hearing held
on April 19, 2010, and a disposition hearing held on August 2, 2010, in the Appellant's
Brief, about those hearings never occurred. (Respondent's Brief, p.4 n.1.) Accordingly,
Mr. Boyce withdraws all assertions of error regarding the foregoing hearings.
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supported by case law, and if taken to its logical conclusion actually limits a district
court's sentencing discretion to consider information from prior hearings because a
transcript of a prior hearing would have to be created before a district court could
consider information from that hearing.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested
Transcripts
Indigent defendants can require the State to pay for an appellate record including

verbatim transcripts of the relevant trial proceedings. However, the State does not have
to provide indigent defendants with anything they request.

In order to meet the

constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the State must provide
indigent defendants with an appellate record. In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court
denied Mr. Boyce's requests for transcripts of his original change of plea hearing,
sentencing hearing, and rider review hearing.

That denial prevents Mr. Boyce from

adequately supporting the issues raised on appeal. Idaho case law requires appellant's
to provide a complete appellate record in order for an appellate court to rule on the
merits of the issues on appeal.
In response to this position, the State argued that the requested transcripts "of
hearings held approximately eight years before the decision at issue" cannot be
considered on appeal because the "as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented
to the district court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, they were never
part of the record before the district court in considering whether to revoke [Mr. Boyce's]
probation and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's
Brief, pp.6-7.) Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the

5

district court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding
whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a
sentencing or probation decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that
information offered at sentencing or a probation disposition hearing. Rather, a court is
entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and observations.
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105
Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are
based, in part, upon what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho
318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of
criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district
and the quantity of drugs therein involved."); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App.
1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case").
Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court
may rely upon the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings
when it made the decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable and inconsistent with case law
because all transcripts, except a transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken,
would be deemed new information. For example, the transcript of the November 10,
2011, evidentiary hearing would be considered new information and irrelevant to the
district court's order revoking probation because it was prepared after the January 11,
2012, probation disposition hearing. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v.
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Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (2000), where the district court examined the defendant

about his guilty plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett
failed to provide a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed
that something occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing
decision. Id. In light of the foregoing authority, the transcript of the December 19, 2002,
sentencing hearing is necessary because the district court questioned Mr. Boyce.
(R., p.35.)
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from an I.C.R. 35 motion. Further, if that is new information, a district
court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at sentencing when
evaluating an I.C.R. 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 452-453
(Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of an appeal
from the denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide the PSI
and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See also State v.
Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984 ). In light of the foregoing authority, the transcript

of the December 19, 2002, sentencing hearing is necessary for review in this case
because the district court questioned Mr. Boyce during that hearing. (R., p.35.)
The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20
(Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988
and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the
district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

Id.

After completing the period of

retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation
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was then revoked. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was
excessive. Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id.
The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where
Warren bit off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the
merits of his sentencing claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original
PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id.

Even though the original

sentencing was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's
claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that the district court referenced the
original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that
the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Boyce failed to request the various transcripts,
the State could have argued that his appeal should have been dismissed for failure to
provide an adequate appellate record.
The State also asserts that Mr. Boyce "with no citation whatsoever, that to 'meet
the constitutional of due process and equal protection,' the state must provide him (and
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the state
proves 'that some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous."'
(Respondent's Brief, p.9 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.7).) Mr. Boyce's burden shifting
argument was based on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 ), where the
United State Supreme Court first held that the State does not need to "waste its funds
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by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review." However, the Court
went on to hold that:
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice
for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our
statement in Draper, 2 that:
'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The
trial judge would have complied with * * * the constitutional mandate
* * * in limitin~ the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing
by the State.'

Id. (footnote omitted). If it is apparent on the record that there is a colorable need for

the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts
are irrelevant. Therefore, l\/lr. Boyce's burden shifting position is supported by the case
law referenced by the State.
In sum, Idaho provides its courts with a very broad range of discretion to consider
information when making sentencing decisions. Due to that broad range of discretion,

2

3

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963).
While addressing on the State's argument the Court also noted that:
[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant.
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an appellant must provide an extensive appellate record in order to challenge a
sentencing or probation revocation determination on appeal because Idaho appellate
courts will presume any missing information will support the district court's decision. In
light of this, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Boyce due process and equal
protection when it denied Mr. Boyce the transcripts of hearings he will need to
overcome this presumption.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation

A

Introduction
The State objected to Mr. Boyce's requests for the transcripts of various hearings

based on a theory that they are irrelevant to the district court's ultimate decision to
revoke probation. The State prevailed with its objection.

In its Respondent's Brief the

State argues that the aggravating evidence contained in the PSI is relevant to
Mr. Boyce's probation argument. The State's positions are contradictory and the State
has gained a procedural advantage in this appeal based on these contradictory
positions.

Therefore, the State should be judicially estopped from utilizing this

advantage. Specifically, Mr. Boyce requests that, if this court determines that items not
offered as evidence at the probation disposition hearing are not relevant this Court
disregard the aggravating evidence contained in the PSI.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation
"The application of judicial estoppel is one of discretion."

140 Idaho 242, 252 (2004).

Sword v. Sweet,

"Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine
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of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining an advantage by
taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible
position . . . . "

McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152 (1997) (quoting Rissetto v.

Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996).
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general
considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the
dignity of judicial proceedings .... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts .... Because it is
intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable
doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion."
Id. (quoting Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601).
In t~1is case, the State objected to Mr. Boyce's request for transcripts of various
hearings. (Objection to Motion to Augment, pp.2-4.) In support of that objection, the
State argued that Mr. Boyce failed to demonstrate that the transcripts played any role in
the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.

(Objection to Motion to

Augment, pp.4.) The State continued to advocate for this position in, Section I, of the
Respondent's Brief, when it argued that Mr. Boyce has failed to explain how "transcripts
of hearings held approximately eight years before the decision at issue in this case are
necessary to decide" the issues currently on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-13.) In
Section
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of the Respondent's Brief, the State then argued as follows:

The district court's determination that alternatives to incarceration were
not feasible is also supported by other information known to the court at
the time it revoked [Mr. Boyce's] probation, including [Mr. Boyce's] criminal
history and his performance on probation. [IVlr. Boyce's] conviction in this
case marked his second conviction for grand theft and his third conviction
for theft offense, generally. (PSI, pp.2-3.) [IVlr. Boyce] committed his first
grand theft when he stole almost $9,000 from the Jack-In-The-Box where
he worked as a shift leader. (PSI, pp.90-91.) In Connection with his
sentencing in that case, [Mr. Boyce] assured the court that "it will never
happen again." (PSI, pp.91.) He was given a withheld judgment and was
placed on probation, which he subsequently violated by failing to pay
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restitution, failing to maintain employment, failing to report to his
supervising officer and failing obtain permission from his supervising
officer before leaving his assigned district. (PSI. pp. 2, 4, 56.) The district
court reinstated him on probation and ordered him to serve 90 days in jail.
(PSI, pp.2, 4.) Less than one year later, while he was still on probation for
his first grand theft conviction, [Mr. Boyce] committed the offense in this
case by stealing approximately $2,700 from the Burger King where he was
employed. (PSI, pp.2, 9, 17, 22-23, 33.)
(Respondent's Brief, p.20.) All of the citations from the preceding quotation are from the
original PSI.

Therefore, the State used the PSI to its benefit in Section II of the

Respondent's Brief.
In light of the foregoing, the State has received an unfair procedural advantage in
this matter because denial of the transcripts of the sentencing hearing and the rider
review hearing prevent Mr. Boyce from addressing any corrections made to the PSI and
the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) at the
respective hearings.

Notably, the court minutes of the June 10, 2003 rider review

hearing, indicate that Mr. Boyce spoke with the district court and, more importantly,
corrections to the APSI were made during that hearing. (R., pp.43-44.) Moreover, there
is no way of knowing if there were corrections made to the PSI at the sentencing
hearing. 4 In fact, this creates a unique procedural due process violation.

4

In criminal

The minutes of the sentencing hearing do not expressly indicate that corrections to the
PSI were made. (R., pp.34-35.) However, this is not dispositive of whether corrections
to the PSI were made at the sentencing hearing because there is no requirement that
sentencing courts redline portions of a PSI they deem unreliable. See State v. Carey
274 P.3d 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals does consider it better practice
for district courts to redline information they deem unreliable to prevent a defendant
from being prejudiced by that information in a subsequent proceeding. State v.
Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, the district court might
have made corrections to the PSI, but there is no way of knowing without the transcripts
of the sentencing hearing.
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prosecutions, one-sided procedural laws, that benefit only the government, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470
(1973). Mr. Boyce asserts that, under a logical extension of the reasoning set forth in
Wardius, there is no legitimate reason why one-sided procedural rulings that benefit

only the government in an appeal should be treated any differently.
In Wardius, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute that required
a criminal defendant to provide written notice of an alibi defense, including the names
and contact information of witnesses, prior to trial, but "made no provision for reciprocal
discovery [from the government]." Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72. The Court noted that
the Due Process Clause "speak[s] to the balance of forces between the accused and
his accuser."

Id. at 474.

As a result, the Court noted that it "has therefore been

particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the
State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a fair
trial." Id. at 474 n. 6. The Court held, "It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant
to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the
hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he
disclosed to the State." Id. at 475-76.
With the principles set forth in Wardius in mind, Mr. Boyce asserts that the
decision to deny Mr. Boyce access to the transcripts of the sentencing and rider review
hearings creates a one-sided procedural advantage for the State.

The PSI is a

permanent record which, after it is created, is sent to the Idaho Department of
Correction and can be used against Mr. Boyce at a later time in the same proceedings
or in subsequent proceedings.

State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App.
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1998). Idaho Criminal Rule 32 (g)(1) guarantees a criminal defendant access to the PSI
and an opportunity to challenge any adverse matters in the report and an opportunity to
present favorable evidence during the sentencing hearing. However, Mr. Boyce's only
opportunity to correct the PSI was at his 2002 sentencing hearing. State v. Person, 145
Idaho 293, 296-297 (Ct. App. 2007). Likewise, Mr. Boyce's only opportunity to correct
the APSI was at the 2003 rider review hearing. 5 Here, the State has access to the
aggravating evidence contained in the PSI, but Mr. Boyce has been denied access to
the transcripts which he could use to establish that the district court made corrections to
that material. In other words, the State has a one sided procedural advantage because
it has access to aggravating evidence, but Mr. Boyce has been denied access to the
materials he could use to challenge that evidence. The need for these transcripts is
amplified because the district court reviewed the PSI and the APSI at the December 8,
2010, probation violation disposition hearing. (08/12/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-18.) 6
In sum, the State has gained a procedural advantage by objecting to the
inclusion of the requested transcripts, which precludes him and appellate counsel from
identifying any potential corrections made to the PSI, and then arguing the substance of
the PSI as an aggravating factor as part of it probation argument. Due to the State's

5

Mr. Boyce recognizes that he does not have a due process right to make corrections
to the APSI. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264-265 (Ct. App. 2003). However,
Goodlett is inapplicable because the district court did make corrections to the APSI.
After making the corrections to the APSI, the court altered the record and its
considerations when it placed him on probation.
6
As a final note, Mr. Boyce's inability to use the transcripts of the sentencing hearing
and the rider review hearing to identify the corrections made to the PSI and the APSI
support his due process argument contained in Section I of this brief. Accordingly, the
arguments made in this section of the Appellant's Reply Brief are incorporated into
Section I.
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contradictory positions and the procedural advantage it attempts to gain, this Court
should be disregard the substance of the PSI in aggravation in this matter.

CONCLUSION

Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Boyce

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district
court to place Mr. Boyce on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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